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rri 
a new triaL 
was denied March 
were of the opinion 
No. fi8:.l:Z. In Bauk. Peb. 
Hcspondent, v. JAMES PAitRARt'lc et al., 
Appellants. 
Gaming-Evidence.-Convictions of recording bets on horse 
§ 337a, subd. 4) and of occupying· 
the purpose of bookmaking were sustairwd evidence 
an on searching one defendant, found a 
c~eratch sheet for a date prior to that of the search and several 
of paper identified as records of bets fm· races TUn 
such date, and by evidence thnt officers, with the use of one 
taken from such defendant, g:1ined entrance to nn apart-
in which they found the other defendant wilh a scratch 
and several pieces of paper similar to those taken from 
first defendant, that these papers were identified as records 
hets in the second defendant's handwriting for races run on 
date of the search, and tbat she admitted bets oYer 
'····y···~···~ for two 
Criminal Law-Venue.-The evidence in a bookmaking pros-
was sufficient to justify the trial court in finding that 
venue was in a certain county where one dcfenilant ad-
Cal.Jur.2d, Gaming and Prize Contests, § 68. 
Dig. References: [1] Gaming, § 22(4) Criminal Law, 
Searches and Seizures, § 1; [4] Criminal Law, § 1271. 
PEOPLE v. F ARRARA [46 C.2d 
bets in an apartment located in that county, 
otlwr defendant was observed at or near the apart-
on the dates of the transactions in question, and where 
defendants' home was also located in such eounty. 
Searches and Seizures-Presumptions and Inferences.---
for bookmaking, IYht>rP it could be inferred 
the arre~tiug uHicers had some information indicating 
but that the)· did not Pnter an apartment with the 
eonsent, and where there was no evidence as to 
whether such information was sufficient to constitute reason-
nhle c:msP to justify the arrests or whether the c•ntry was 
by the dPnwnd and explanation required by Pen. 
§ 84±, but ohjeetion was first made on appeal, it was 
to he presumed, in the a bseltef' of eontrary evidence, that the 
off\ en~ regularly and lawfully performed their duties in 
thP arrests and the searches and seizurPs incident 
thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.) 
Criminal Law- Appeal-- Presumptions.-Error will not be 
on appeal. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los 
County granting probation and denying a new trial. 
Clement D. Nye, Judge. Affirmed. 
G. Vernon Brumbaugh for Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Joan D. Gross, 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defenc1ants James and Helen Farrara 
from orders granting them probation and denying 
their motion for a new trial entered after they were found 
of violations of Penal Code, section 337a. A jury 
trial was waived and it was stipulated that the case should 
he submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
Each defendant was found guilty of one count of recording 
bets on horse races (Pen. Code, § 337 a, sub d. ( 4) ) , and Helen 
found guilty of one count of occupying premises for 
the purpose of bookmaking. (Pen. Code, § 337a subd. (2).) 
On October 28, 1954, Officer Sherrer of the Los Angeles 
Police Department observed James Farrara get into his car 
11ear the corner of 8th and Cochran in Los Angeles. Two 
other officers got into the car with James and the car was 
See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
PEOPLE V. FARRARA 
[46 C.2d 265; 294 P.2d 21] 
little lrss than a block. .James thrn 
and Officer Sherrer searched him. He found 
sheet for October 27th, and several of 
that ~were identified as records of bets for races run on 
Although ,James told Officer Sherrer that he did 
about these papers, there was rvidence 
1vas his. 
thereafter at approximately 12.35 p. m. on 
Officer Sherrer and hm other officers 
apartment about half a block away on South 
])1· use of one of the keys taken from ,James. 
IIelen Farrara in the bedroom with a scratch sheet for 
~8th several pieces of paper similar to those tahn 
,James. 'rhese papers were identified as records of bds 
Helen's handvYriting for races run on the 28th, and Helen 
taking bets over the telephone for two 
was reg·ularly occupied by Maxine 
friend of the defendants, IYho was present when the officers 
Before the arrests, the officers had had the and 
defPndants under observation and had seen both of them go 
to ihe apartment on the 27th. James arrived before 10 a. m. 
and left shortly after 1 p. m. Helen left her home abont 12 :30 
Jl. m., went to the apartment, and left there at about 5 :2i:J p. 
Xeither defendant took the stand or presented any evideJJee 
otl1er than by cross-examining prosecution witnesst>s. 
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to 
conclusion of the trial court that each defendant was 
of recording bets and that Helen was guilty of occupying the 
apartment "with paprrs ... for the purpose of 
... bets." (Pen. Code,§ 337a, subd. (2).) [2] There is 110 
merit in defendants' contention that venue was not 
Helen admitted taking bets in the apartment, IYhieh 1ras 
located in r~os Angeles County, and James was obserwd at 
or ncar the apartment on both the 27th and the 28th. More-
over, since the defendants' home was also loeated in Lo;:; 
it may reasonably be inferred that ,James did not 
lean; the connty to record the bets on raees run on tlw 27th. 
Defendants contend that the officers did not have rcasonablr' 
1·a to believe that either of them had committed a 
and that the arrests and the searches and seizm·0s incident 
'':\faxine Shaman was also charged with violations of Penal Code, 
section 337a, but as to her the information was set aside pursuant 
her motion made under Penal Code, section 995. 
268 
therefore In 
officers violated section 844 of the Penal Code by 
the to enter the to make an arrest 
without first ' demanded admittance and explained 
the purpose for which admittance is desired.'' .Accordingly, 
conclude that the evidence should have been excluded. 
case was tried before the decision in v. 
CaL2d 434 P.2d was made 
and no 
does not appear 
whether or not the offieers had warrants for defendants' ar-
rest or for the seareh of the or reasonable cause to 
believe that had committed a Prom the fact, 
that the officers had defendants and the apartment 
under observation, it may be inferred that they had some 
information indicating guilt, but the record is completely 
silent as to whether or not such information was sufficient to 
constitute reasonable cause to the arrests. Similarly, 
it may be inferred from the fact that the officers used the key 
taken from James to enter the apartment they did not enter 
with the consent of the occupants, but the record is also com-
pletely silent as to whether or not the \Yas preceded 
by the demand and explanation required by section 844. 
In People v. Kitchens, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17], we 
held that the rule that the admissibility of evidence will not 
be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a proper objection 
in the trial court, is not applicable to appeals based on the 
admission of illegally obtained evidence in cases that were 
tried before the Cahan decision. \V e were careful to point 
out, however, that there was "sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the conclusion that the search and seizure 
at the time of defendant's arrest were unlawful." In Badillo 
v. Superior Oout·t, post, p. 269 [294 P.2d 231, vve held 
in this respect that "the defendant makes a prima facie 
case when he f'stabJishes that an arrest was made without a 
warrant or that private were entered or a search 
made without a search warrant, and the burden then rests 
on the to show proper justification. [Citations.]" 
[4, In the prcsNJt case, on the contrary, there is no 
such aml to reverse the judgment it ·would be neces-
Rary to presume that the officers acted illegally and that the 
trial court erred in admitting the evidence so obtained. It is 
settled, however, that error will not be presumed on appeal 
and concurred. 
and J., concurred in the 
J.-I dissent. 
reasons stated in my dissenting in People 
Crim. 5758, p. 106 [293 P.2d , and 
Beard, Crim. 5809, post, p. 278 [294 P.2d 29], 
reverse the judgment in the case at bar. 
F. No. 19346. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.] 
BADILLO, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COUR'r 
THE CI'rY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
Prohibition-Application of Rules- Criminal Proceedings-
Accusatory Pleading.-A defendant is held to answer without 
reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is based en-
on and in such a case the trial 
should 
§ 99;3), and if it does not do so a peremptory writ of 
will issue to prohibit further proceedings. 
Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds-
Evidence Illegally Obtained.-Where evidence before the 
bearing on the issue of illegality of a search or 
seizure is in conflict or susceptible of conflicting inferences 
See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 21; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22. 
Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 44; [2, 4] Indictment 
Information, § 88 ( 6) ; [3, 5, 6] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [7] 
Law,§ 410. 
